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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case
Insofar as is germane to this appeal, this lawsuit arises out of a dispute between
Complete Property Management and Investment Realty, Inc., henceforth called "CPM in
this document, and Tricia Callies, henceforth called "Callies" in this document, on one side
and Charter Builders, Inc., Charter Pointe Apartments, LLC, and Silver Oaks, LLC,
henceforth respectively called "CBI", "Charter Pointe" and "Silver Oaks" in this document,
on the other over real estate commissions claimed by CPM and Callies to be owed by CBI,
Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks. The crux of the dispute for purposes of this appeal is the
sufficiency of the legal descriptions in the listing agreements executed by the parties.
Course of Proceedings Below
On October 3, 2006, October 24, 2006 and November 8, 2006, Tricia Callies, the
broker for CPM, henceforth called "Callies" in this document, CPM and other plaintiffs filed
a series of three complaints against a number of defendants, including CBI, Charter Pointe,
Silver Oaks and George O'Neal, the president of CBI, henceforth called "O'Neal" in this
document. R, Vol. I, pp. 20-29,65-71, and 78-117. These lawsuits asserted a number of
causes of action connected with the limited liability companies, including claims for breach
of contract, unjust enrichment and judicial dissolution. It is the third of these complaints,
that filed on November 8, 2006, as case no. CV OC 0620977, R, Vol. I, pp. 78-117, that
set forth the claims for the real estate commissions at issue in this appeal. On November
15, 2006, CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks filed counterclaims against Callies in the
first of the lawsuits, that filed on October 3, 2006, as case no. CV OC 0618504. R, Vol. I,
pp. 30-55. Those counterclaims sought, among other things, a declaration that the listing
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agreements at issue in the third lawsuit were invalid for failure to set forth a legally
enforceable description of the property concerned by the contracts. R, Vol. I, pp. 38-42.
Callies denied this counterclaim on November 30, 2006, referring in her answer to the
complaint previously filed in the third case. R, Vol. I, pp. 56-63. On March 16, 2007, the
three lawsuits were consolidated into the first action, case no. 0618504, which brought
together, into one case, the conflicting pleadings described above. R, Vol. I,pp. 6,64 and
77.
On April 18, 2007, CBI and Charter Pointe filed motions for partial summary
judgment seeking the dismissal of the claims for payment of the commissions and a judicial
determination that the listing agreements were unenforceable for want of a valid property
description. R, Vol. I, pp. 122-125. While undersigned counsel, who substituted into this
action only after the appeal had been filed, does not see a comparable motion filed by
Silver Oaks in the record, it is clear that the parties and court deemed that defendant to
have joined in the motions as well. R, Vol. II, p. 302.
The trial court granted the requested partial summary judgments by memorandum
decision and order entered on August 31,2007. R, Vol. 11, pp. 302-318. On the strength
of this decision, an amended judgment was entered on December 19, 2007, in which the
court recited that CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oakes had recovered judgment on all
claims regarding the commissions, including their request for declaratory relief and CPM's
and Callies' claim for monetary damages. R, Vol. II, pp. 325-327. This amended judgment
included a certificate executed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. R, Vol. II, p. 327. CPM and Cailies filed their notice of appeal on January 28,
2008. R, Vol. II, pp. 330-335.
-2-

Statement of Facts
Consistent with the rules by which summary judgments are to be evaluated on
appeal, Callies and CPM state the facts in the record in the light most favorable to them,
taking advantage of any inferences that may reasonably be drawn in their favor from the
facts appearing of record and resolving any doubts against the moving party. Matter of
Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct.App. 1994). Those facts show the
claims against Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks to be generally alike for purposes of this
appeal.
Callies and CPM entered into their listing agreement with Charter Pointe on March
1, 2005. R, Exh. 7, paragraph 2. The property that they were to sell for Charter Pointe
consisted of 32 four-plexes, comprising a total of 128 units. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. The
legal description of the property on which the units were to be placed had been prepared
before the contract was signed, but the final plat detailing the individual units was not
2006. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. Before that recording, on February
recorded until April II,
28, 2006, the listing agreement had been extended. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. Moreover,
before the execution of the extension agreement, R, Exh. 8, p. 15, O'Neal had provided
Callies with individuallegal descriptions based upon a preliminary plat showing the location
of the individual units. R, Exh. 8 paragraph 2. At that time, this plat was inserted by the
parties into their files pertaining to the listing agreement. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. Once
the plat was approved but before any closings occurred on the purchase and sale of any
individual units, O'Neal provided Callies with definitive legal descriptions for each of the
individual units in the project. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. This description tied the individual
units to the final plat. R, Exh. 8, pp. 12-13.
-3-

Not until after the recording of the final plat did Charter Pointe and the purchasers
located by Callies and CPM proceed to closing. Some of the closings occurred as
scheduled, but in other instances the buyers backed out of the contracts because Charter
Pointe failed to complete the units on time. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 9 and 13. Not until
immediately before the closings began to occur did anyone question whether Callies or
CPM were entitled to the commissions from Charter Pointe. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 6 and
7.
The facts concerning the Silver Oaks development differed from those of Charter
Pointe in that the execution of the listing agreement was not completed until March 7,
2005, and this project consisted of 70 four-plexes, or 280 units. R, Exh. 9, paragraph 2.
Moreover, the legal description of the property on which the Silver Oaks units were to be
placed was not prepared until March 14, 2005, after the listing agreement had been
signed. R, Exh. 9, paragraph 2. However, once this occurred, the general progression of
the Silver Oaks project was like that of Charter Pointe. O'Neal provided Callies with legal
descriptions for the individual units based upon the preliminary plat showing the location
of the individual units before the listing agreement was extended on February 28, 2006.

R, Exh. 9, paragraphs 2 and 5. This platwas placed by the parties into their files pertaining
to the listing agreement. R, Exh. 9, paragraph 2. Not until Callies raised some of the
financial issues involved in the litigation did anyone question whether Callies and CPM
were entitled to the commissions from Silver Oaks. R, Exh. 9, paragraphs 7 and 8.
The differences in the facts relating to the two projects are not significant for present
purposes. Distilled to their essence, the facts show that, when the listing agreements were
originally signed, there was no legal description available forthe individual units that Callies
-4-

and CPM were to sell for either Charter Pointe or Silver Oakes. However, in both
instances, the parties later added legal descriptions for the individual units set forth in
preliminary plats to their contracts and included the plats in the relevant files before any
transaction closed. In the case of Charter Pointe, O'Neal provided Callies with definitive
legal descriptions for the individual units before any sales of the individual units closed.
At no time in the marketing of either project was there any confusion between
Callies on one side and Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks on the other as to what property
was being sold. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 2 and 6 and Exh. 9, paragraphs 2 and 7. The
contracts and the process followed by the parties in the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks
projects were the same as those which they had successfully used in the marketing of
seven other projects: Concord Commons, Boomer, Fenway Park Fourplexes and
Townhomes, Pheasant Run, Lake Forest, Hampton Estates and Foxboro. R, Exh. 8,
paragraph 2 and Exh. 9, paragraph 2. These procedures were intended to enable the
developers, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, to pay for the development of their projects
with the funds generated by contracts negotiated by Callies and CPM before the legal
descriptions for the property were available. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 2 and Exh. 9,
paragraph 2. All of the contracts that were signed and sales that occurred were brokered
by Callies. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 9 and Exh. 9, paragraph 11. Callies devoted substantial
time to the projects and incurred costs of $97,239.26 in marketing the properties. In
addition, she turned down many offers to work on other projects because of her
involvement in the projects at issue in this litigation. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 10 and 12 and
Exh. 9, paragraphs 14 and 15.

ISSUESPRESENTEDONAPPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to recognizethe genuine issues of material fact

that precluded it from entering summary judgment in this action?
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the listing agreementswere

unenforceable for lack of legally enforceable descriptions of the property to be sold
pursuant to the agreements?
3.

Did the trial court err in analyzing the motions for summary judgment on the

basis of ldaho Code Section 9-503 rather than ldaho Code Section 9-508?
4.

Did the trial court err in its analysis of the rights of CPM and Callies to recover

damages on the theory of partial performance?
5.

Did the trial court err in its analysis of the rights of CPM and Callies to recover

damages on the basis of quasi-estoppel?
6.

Is Callies entitled to the attorney fees incurred in the course of this appeal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the grant of a summary judgment, this Court's standard of review
is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on the original motion.
IntermountainForest Managementv.Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 ldaho 233,235,31 P.3d
921, 923 (2001). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sacred
Heart Medical Center v. Boundary County, 338 ldaho 534, 66 P.3d 238 (2003). The
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with
the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 ldaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d
960, 963 (1994). The appellate court liberally construes the record in the light most
-6-

favorable to the party opposing the motionfor summaryjudgmentand draws all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Rudd v. Merriff, 138 ldaho 256,66 P.3d
230 (2003). When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review, is not
bound by findings of the district court, and is free to draw its own conclusions from the
evidence presented. Leffunich v. Key Bank Nat? Ass'n, 141 ldaho 362, 366, 109 P.3d
1104, 1108 (2005).
ARGUMENT

1. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Recognize the Genuine Issues
of Material Fact Created by the Affidavits of Tricia Callies
That Precluded the Summary Judgment at Issue in This Appeal.
In its analysis of the facts of the case, the trial court focused upon the state of the
property descriptions as of the signing of the contracts and failed to take into account the
additions to, and revisions of, the original agreements as the projects evolved:
Here, although the listing agreement explicitly stated that a legal description was
attached as 'addendum # 1,' and provided that the 'addendum must accompany the
original listing,' the addenda were not attached to any of the agreements. . . .
Moreover, because the record unequivocallyestablishesthat the listing agreements
erroneously stated that the legal descriptions were attached, when in fact no such
descriptions were affixed, when construing I.C. 5 9-503 in conjunction with I.C. § 542050 as in Garner, the Court finds that the property descriptions are insufficient to
satisfy the statute of frauds and fail to meet the statutory requirement of I.C. 5 542050(l)(b).
R, Vol. II, pp. 311-312. Neither CPM nor Callies has claimed that the original agreements
included a detailed description of the property to be sold at the time that they were signed.
However, both CPM and Callies assert that, whatever the deficiencies of the agreements
in their original form, the parties remedied those problems by subsequently adding legally
enforceable property descriptions to the contracts before any transactions closed and
before CPM or Callies made any claim that commissions were due. In taking this position,

CPM and Callies recognize that O'Neal has taken a contrary position in his affidavit by
claiming that he never consented to the addition of the property descriptions to the
agreement. R, Exh. 2, paragraphs 9 and 10. But all that testimony does is give rise to an
issue of fact that should have been resolved by a jury after hearing all of the evidence
rather than by the court on the motions for partial summary judgment. Hayes v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 143 ldaho 204, 41 P.3d 1073 (2006).
There is no rule of law to the effect that the parties to a contract cannot amend the
agreement to correct an omission, oversight or error in the original documentation or even
just because they choose to do so. To the contrary, ldaho law expressly permits such
revisions when the evidence supports the conclusion that they actually occurred. Parties
are free to amend their agreements. Traylor V. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 99 ldaho 560, 585
P.2d 970 (1978). The terms of a written contract may be varied, modified, waived,
annulled or wholly set aside by any subsequently executed contract, whether the later
agreement be in writing or parol. Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 101 ldaho
226,611 P.2d 1011 (1979); Harrington v. McCarfhy, 91 ldaho 307,420 P.2d 790 (1966).
Consent to a modification of a prior written agreement may be implied from a course of
conduct consistent with the asserted modification. Resource Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94
ldaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972); Jones v. Micron Technology, Inc., 129 ldaho 241, 923
P.2d 486 (Ct.App. 1996).
The listing agreements at issue in this lawsuit are "RE-16 EXCLUSIVE SELLER
REPRESENTATIONAGREEMENT" forms. In relevant part, the form documents provide:

"2. PROPERTY ADDRESS AND LEGAL DESCRIPTION. The property address and the complete legal description of
the property are as set forth below.
Address
County
City
Zip
Legal Description

or "Legal Description Attached as addendum #
listing)"

(Addendum must accompany original

(Exhibits # 8 and 9 to Clerk's Record on Appeal). Nothing in this printed language states
when the addendum must be attached to or accompany the printed contract. The district
simply assumed that the description had to be attached when the contract was originally
signed. In so doing, the court ignored the rule that the conduct of the parties to the
contract is an important factor that should be considered in interpreting an agreement in
the event of a dispute as to its meaning, Commercial Credit Corp. v. S&EEnferprises, Inc.,
97 ldaho 441, 546 P.2d 396 (1976), and all of the historical evidence offered by Callies

concerning the seven other subdivisions that the parties had sold using the same contract
forms and following the same process that was employed in the marketing of the two
projects at issue. That evidence uniformly militates in favor of the interpretation that the
agreement permitted the parties to incorporate legally enforceable property descriptions
into their agreements at some time after the documents were originally signed.
Moreover, this conclusion corroborates other testimony by Callies that, after the
execution of the original documents, the parties added to their contracts legal descriptions
of the individual units provided by O'Neal in the form of preliminary and final plats as those
documents became available in the course of developing the two projects at issue in this
appeal. Since on a motion for summary judgment, all of Callies' testimony must be
presumed to be true, Hei v. Holzer, 139 ldaho 31, 73 P.2d 94 (2003), this court cannot
reasonably hold, as a matter of law, that the parties did not contemplate the addition of

property descriptions to their agreements as those descriptions became available,
Moreover, even if the parties did originally contemplate the attachment of the
property descriptions at the time that they executed the original documents, the case law
cited above amply demonstrates that they were free to alter and amend their original
contracts at a later time. The testimony by Callies regarding the later inclusion by the
parties of detailed property descriptions into their agreements is entirely consistent with the
conclusion that the parties did, in fact, amend their agreements as they progressed through
the projects.
The trial court's analysis simply assumed away these factual issues and adopted
the contested testimony of O'Neal to the effect that he had not consented to any addition
to, or revision of, the original agreements. R, Exh. 2, paragraphs 9 and 10. By doing that,
the court implicitly decided the disputed issue of fact in favor of CBI, Charter Pointe and
Silver Oaks based upon its perception of relative merits of the affidavits of O'Neal and
Callies. It is well established that this is erroneous on the context of summary judgment
proceedings. Collord v. Cooley, 92 ldaho 789,451 P.2d 535 (1969). If the record permits
conflicting inferences, or where reasonable minds can reach difference conclusions from
the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. G&MFarms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119
ldaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). The summary judgment granted by the district court in
this case should be reversed on account of its failure to recognize the issues of fact that
precluded that judgment.
2. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Listing Agreements Were Not
Enforceable for Lack of Legally Enforceable Descriptions of the Property.

The analysis of Section 1 of this brief now brings us to the question of whether the

legal descriptions added to the agreements after they were signed, whether by original
intent or by subsequent amendment of the contracts, were "legally enforceable" under
ldaho Code Section 9-508 or ldaho Code Section 9-503. It is important to note that the
trial court never reached this issue, because neither CBI, Charter Pointe nor Silver Oaks
made any argument that the property descriptions used by Callies and CPM in marketing
the property were deficient. Instead, the only claim advanced in the motions for summary
judgment was the position, shown in Section 1 of this brief to be untenable, that the
agreements were not enforceable simply because the property descriptions were not a part
of the agreements when they were originally signed. The sufficiency of the'descriptions
that Callies asserts to have been added to the contracts may be important, however, given
this court's power to affirm the decision of the trial court on grounds not used by the trial
court as the basis for its decision. See McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 ldaho 657,851
P.2d 953 (1993); Martin v. Spalding, 133 ldaho 469, 988 P.2d 695 (Ct.App. 1998).
As explained by this court in Central ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 ldaho 306,
442 P.2d 442 (1968), ldaho Code Section 9-508 provides that, in the context of listing
agreements like those at issue in this case, the descriptions of the property affected by the
agreements are sufficient where it is shown that there is no misunderstanding between the
seller and broker as to the property involved and where the descriptions are sufficient to
enable the broker to locate the property, show it and point out its boundaries to the
prospective purchasers.
In this case, viewed on the light most favorable to CPM and Callies, the record
shows that O'Neal gave Callies legal descriptions of the individual units in the projects at
issue that were based either on preliminary or final plats, depending upon the status of the
-11-

project at the time. No one has claimed any misunderstandingas to the property that was
involved in any one of the many agreements brokered by Callies that are at issue in this
lawsuit. No one has claimed that Callies was not able to show the property to the
prospective buyers. There is no evidence that any agreement brokered by Callies failed
to close on account of a misunderstanding by anyone as to what property was being
bought or sold. To the contrary, the fact that many of the transactions brokered by Callies
actually closed reasonably suggests that she was, in fact, able to show the property
adequately. Thus, the record establishes that the descriptions appended to the listing
agreements at issue in this lawsuit meet the standards established by ldaho Code Section
9-508 and Central ldaho Agency.
Stated in other terms, while it is undisputed that the listing agreements included only
vague descriptions of the property to be sold when they were originally signed, they
included precise definitions of the property when transactions began to close, which is
when Callies and CPM made their claims for commissions The sufficiency of the legal
description when the listing agreement was originally signed is not the real issue. Instead,
the issue is, or at least should be, the sufficiency of those descriptions when the claims for
commissions were asserted. Callies' testimony indicates those descriptions to be very
precise at that time, and O'Neal's testimony to the contrary must, for purposes of analyzing
the motion for partial summary judgment, be disregarded.

This court should rule

accordingly by reversing the summary judgment granted by the trial court.
Stated in other terms, under ldaho Code Section 9-508 and Central ldaho Agency,
the test is whether the parties had a meeting of the minds as to the property subject to the
brokerage agreement. Whether there has been a meeting of the minds on any issue is

generally a determination left to the trier of fact. Hess v. Wheeler, 127 ldaho 151, 823
P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1995). Given the conflicting testimony by O'Neal and Callies in their
affidavits, and the rules regarding that evidence on summary judgment proceedings, this
court cannot reasonably uphold a grant of summary judgment against CPM and Callies on
the basis that the record fails to establish a meeting of the minds in this case. Central
ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, supra.
Under ldaho Code Section 9-503, the standard is different: the description of the
property must be such that it can be ascertained without resort to parol evidence or such
that the quantity, identity or boundaries of the property can be determined from the face
of the agreement. Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire,140 ldaho 276,
92 P.3d 526 (2004). As stated in Garnerv. Bartschi, 139 ldaho 430,80 P.3d 1031 (2003):
"As a general rule, a written instrument purporting to convey real property
must contain a sufficient description of the property. A description contained
in a deed will be sufficient so long as quan.tity,-identity or boundaries of
property can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference
to extrinsic evidence to which it refers."
In this case, if the court agrees with the proposition that it is an issue of fact as to
whether the property descriptions that O'Neal gave Callies were incorporated into the
agreements between the parties, the conclusion that the trial court should have denied the
motions for summary judgment under this standard follows immediately because those
descriptions tie the individual units to either preliminary or final plats for the projects at
issue. Since the property descriptions referred to a plat, it is hard to imagine how they
could be more precise. Certainly, this court cannot hold at this stage of the proceedings,
as a matter of law, that a reference to a plat is not a legally enforceable description of the
property.

CPM and Callies believe that the district court's error in this regard lay in its failure
to consider the property descriptions to which Callies testified as additions to, or revisions
of, the parties' agreements. Instead, the court treated the documents originally signed by
the parties as their entire agreements and Callies' testimony regarding the property
descriptions only as parol evidence intended to provide descriptions that were not
otherwise included in the agreement, apparently because they were not "attached" to and
did not "accompany" the printed agreement as called for in the printed contract. R, Vol.
11, p. 312. This analysis, however, overlooks the possibility that the parties waived or
modified this term of the original contract by means of the subsequent additions to, or
revisions of, the original agreement by means of the property descriptions to which Callies
testified. "Parties to an unperformed written contract may, by mutual consent, modify it by
altering, excising or adding provisions, and such modification may be by parol agreement
or inferred from the conduct of the parties." Harrington v. McCarfhy, supra. In view of
Callies' testimony, it is a question of fact whether or not the parties modified or eliminated
any requirement in the contract that the property descriptions be attached to, or
accompany those documents.
There is no legal reason why the propertydescriptions absolutely had to beattached
to the original contract documents, for it is well settled in ldaho that a contract may be
comprised of several documents. Hunt v. Capital State Bank, 12 ldaho 588, 87 P. 1129
(1906). The question of whether a written contract has been modified by oral agreement
is for the trier of fact. Denneft v. Kuenzli, 130 ldaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1997).
Similarly, the question of whether the parties intended their contract to be comprised of
several documents is a question of fact, not properly resolved on summary judgment. Cf.,

Armand v. Opportunity Management Co., Inc., 141 ldaho 709,117 P.3d 123 (2005); Miller

v. Estate of Prater, 141 ldaho 208, 108 P.3d 355 (2005).
For all of the reasons set forth here, this court should reverse the summary
judgment against CPM and Callies to permit a finding of fact to evaluate the sufficiency of
the legal descriptions appended by the parties to their original agreements.

3. The District Court Erred in Failing to Apply ldaho Code
Section 9-508 Rather Than ldaho Code Section 9-503
to the Motions for Summary Judgment.
While the summary judgment granted by the trial court should be reversed in any
event for the reasons set forth in sections Iand 2 of this brief, the trial court and parties
will, on reward, once again be faced with the issue of deciding, in light of all the evidence,
whether the property descriptions in the listing agreements at issue in this case are legally
enforceable. When they reach that point, they need to know what statute is controlling.
Therefore, to assist the district court and the parties on remand, CPM and Callies request
the court to review the final court's conclusion that ldaho Code Section 9-503 rather than
ldaho Code Section 9-508 defines the proper standard. See Messina v. Ker, 96 ldaho 75,
524 P.2d 536 (1974); Sulik v. Central Valley Farms, Inc., 95 ldaho 826, 521 P.2d 144

(1974).
ldaho Code Section 54-2050(1)(b) requires brokerage representation agreements
such as those involved in this action to include "a legally enforceable description of the
property." The question then becomes one of determining exactly what that means. One
possible point of reference is ldaho Code Section 9-503, which is a statute of frauds that
concerns, by its express terms, transfers of interests in real property. The other possible
point of reference is ldaho Code Section 9-508, which is a statute of frauds that deals
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specifically with real estate commission agreements. Having identified the possible points
of reference, the issue becomes one of choosing between them. Neither statute expressly
requires a description of the property at issue. However, both statutes have been held by
the courts to require such a description. See Lexington Heights Development, LLC v.
Crandlemire, supra (I.C. Section 9-503), and Central ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, supra
(I.C. Section 9-508).
Nevertheless, the choice between the two statutes is rendered easy by the maxim
of statutory construction that statutes concerning the same subject matter, or which are "in
pari materia", must be construed together. Matter ofAdopfion of Chaney, 126 ldaho 554,
887 P.2d 1061 (1995). Both ldaho Code Section 54-2050 and ldaho Code Section 9-508
concern real estate brokerage agreements. ldaho Code Section 9-503 concerns, as noted
above, transfers of real property.
Idaho's Supreme Court has recognized that brokerage contracts are not intended
to transfer real property. See Central ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, supra. Therefore, in
analyzing the sufficiency of a legal description under ldaho Code Section 54-2050, ldaho
Code Section 9-508, rather than ldaho Code Section 9-503, should control, since like
ldaho Code Section 54-2050, Section 9-508 specifically concerns real estate commission
agreements. By contrast, ldaho Code Section 9-503 simply does not apply to this case
because the controversy because the commission agreements at issue are not intended
as contracts for the transfer of real property.
The trial court's choice of ldaho Code Section 9-503 as the controlling statute
followed from its conclusion that ldaho Code Section 54-2050(1)(b) was intended by the
legislature to negate the holding of Central ldaho Agency. R, Vol. 11, p. 313. That
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conclusion, however, is contrary to the rule of statutory construction that the court should
presume that the legislaturedid

intend to change the common law unless the language

of the statute clearly indicates the legislature's intent to do so. Thompson v. City of
Lewiston, 137 ldaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). In this case, ldaho Code Section 542050(l)(b) provides only that the legal description should be "legally enforceable" without
defining the context in which the description had to be "legally enforceable" or the standard
by which this had to be determined.
It is presumed that the legislature knew of Central ldaho Agency when it enacted
ldaho Code Section 54-2050. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway
District, 126 ldaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1999). Given that presumption, the language of
54-2050(1)(b) cannot reasonably be understood clearly to indicate the legislature's
disapproval of Centralldaho Agency and therefore should be read as an expression of the
legislature's satisfaction with the court's construction of ldaho Code Section 9-508. The
legislature could easily have made any dissatisfaction plain by adding an explicit reference
to ldaho Code Section 9-503 in ldaho Code Section 54-2040(1)(b)with such language as,
"A description of the property that is legally enforceable under ldaho Code Section 9-503.
That would clearly have indicated the legislature's disagreement with Central ldaho
Agency. In the absence of such clarity, ldaho law requires ldaho Code Section 542040(l)(b) to be understood as an endorsement of the court's prior construction of ldaho
Code Section 9-508. Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 41 ldaho 776, 242 P. 785
(1928).
The requirements of ldaho Code Section 9-508, includingthe adequacy of the legal
description of the property concerned by a brokerage contract are defined in Centralldaho
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Agency, lnc. v. Turner, supra. That case, in fact, expressly deals with at length with the
question of legal descriptions.
Despite that fact, the trial court in this case mentioned Central Idaho Agency in the
course of its opinion only to state that it was not controlling. R, Vol. 11, p. 312. In so doing,
however, the trial court failed to recognize the full import of the holding in that case:
By a strained construction of the decision in Allen v. Kitchen, it would be
Dossible to hold that the descri~tioninvolved in this case could be corrected bv oarol
or extrinsic evidence so as to "applyuit to the property to be sold. However, we 'think
it illogical to apply the rule of the Allen case-in which the plaintiff sought specific
performance of a contract for the sale of real estate-to an action upon a brokerage
contract as was done in Murphy v. Livesay. A contract employing a broker to find
a purchaser of real property, is not a contract to sell, convey, or encumber real
property or any interest therein. It is purely a contract of employment for services
to be performed by the broker for a commission to be paid upon the occurrence of
certain specified events. Ordinarily such a contract would not support an action to
compel conveyance of the property involved. The present action does not seek any
such relief. It was brought solely for the recovery of the commission provided for in
the agreement. In such a case the description in the agreement is sufficient where
it is shown that there is no misunderstanding between the property owner and the
broker as to the property to be offered for sale, and where it is sufficient to enable
the broker to locate the property, show it, and point out its boundaries to the
prospective purchaser. In this case both plaintiff and defendant knew from the
description contained in the agreement that the property to be sold was the entire
"Clara Turner farm." The farm was well known in the neighborhood. Its exact
acreage and location as to county and section numbers was readily available and
could be established by parol or other extrinsic evidence without varying, adding to,
or subtracting from the agreement which the parties intended to make. Such
evidence would apply the description to the land in harmony with the manifest
intention of the parties.
We conclude that the description in the brokerage agreement involved herein
was sufficient for the purposes of this action. The decisions in Murphy v. Livesay,
supra, and Laker Land & Loans v. Nye, supra-in some respects distinguishablefrom
the case at bar-to the extent that they are in conflict herewith, are overruled.
The applicable rule as variously stated by the following authorities is
that the listing agreement must, inter alia, identify the real property adequately as
between the broker and the vendor. If it is thus sufficient to identify the property,
although defective, ambiguous, or uncertain, it may be supplemented by parol or
extrinsic evidence. Such evidence may be presented, not to create a description,

but to cure a defective one otherwise sufficient. When that is done it will be held in
compliance with the statute, I.C. § 9-508. See Sherwood v. Gerking, 209 Or. 493,
306 P.2d 386 (1957) and cases cited therein; Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158
P.2d 134, 159 A.L. R. 256 (1945) and cases cited therein; See generally, Anno. 38
A.L.R.2d 542, at 557, § 6; Anno. 80 A.L.R. 1456, at 1466; 12 Am.Jur.Zd, Brokers,
46,252; 12 C.J.S. Brokers, 62; contra, see Heim v. Faulstich, Wash., 424 P.2d
1012 (1967).
Central ldaho Agency v. Turner, supra. It is worth noting that Murphy v. Livesay, 34 ldaho
793,197 P. 536 (1921) and LakerLand& Loans v. Ney, 40 ldaho 793,237 P. 630 (1925),
the two cases overruled in Central ldaho Agency, were listinglcommission cases which
applied ldaho Code Section 9-503 in their analysis. That is exactly what the trial court did
in this case. If that approach was erroneous when Central ldaho Agency was decided, it
is still erroneous now.
The language quoted from Central ldaho Agency is broad enough to cover the
issues involved in this case. Whatever the deficiency in the legal descriptions alleged in
this action, ldaho Code Section 9-508 is still the controlling statute. Stated in other words,
the lack of a description of the property in the original agreement does not render ldaho
Code Section 9-503 the controlling statute. Instead, the effect of that omission should be
analyzed under ldaho Code Section 9-508 rather than ldaho Code Section 9-503.
The cases cited by the trial court do not alter this conclusion. These cases include:
Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, supra; Allen v. Kitchen, 16 ldaho
133, 100 P. 1052 (1909); City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 ldaho
239, 16 P. 3d 915 (2000), and Garner v. Bartschi, supra. (R. Vol. 11, 307-313).
Lexington Heights concerned the sufficiency of a property description in a case
involving the transfer of real property. In the course of its analysis, the Court stated: "The

instant case is not one to enforce a listing agreement." 140 ldaho at 285. Logically
enough in view of that statement, the court never mentioned ldaho Code Section 9-508 in
the course of its opinion.
Allen was an "action by the plaintiff for the specific performance of an executory
contract for the sale of real estate." 16 ldaho at 134. Therefore, like Lexington Heights
and ANen, did not address the issue in the instant case which involves, not a transfer of
real property, but commission agreements between the seller and real estate broker. And,
probably because the decision was announced in 1909, and ldaho Code Section 9-508
was first enacted in 1919, the court did not consider ldaho Code Section 9-508 in the
course of its decision.
Like Lexington Heights and Allen, City of Kellogg concerned the sufficiency of the
legal description in a case involving a contract for the transfer of real property, not a
commission agreement. Therefore, the court's analysis did not address ldaho Code
Section 9-508. Given the issues of the case, there was no reason for the court to have
discussed that statute and that Central ldaho Agency is the controlling precedent. See R,
VOI. II, pp. 312-313.
The case of Garner v. Bartschi, supra, involved the sufficiency of the legal
description both as to a purchase and sale agreement and as to a listing agreement. In
affirming a summary judgment against the real estate agent, the court relied upon ldaho
Code Sections 54-2050 and 9-503. There is, however, no indication in the opinion that any
of the parties had asserted ldaho Code Section 9-508 to be controlling. In fact, the court's
discussion in Garner never once mentions ldaho Code Section 9-508 or Central ldaho

Agency. Hence, the precedentialvalue of Garner in this action is doubtful because Callies
and CPM have consistently argued that ldaho Code Section 9-508 is the controlling
statute.
This is not to say that the bottom-line result of Garnerwas wrong. Taking the court's
analysis of the facts involved in that case at face value, it appears that the property
description in that case would have failed under either ldaho Code Section 9-503 or
Section 9-508. CPM and Callies do assert, however, that Garner is of limited precedential
value in the case at bar, because for whatever reason, the court did not analyze ldaho
Code Section 9-508 or Central ldaho Agency in the course of reaching its decision.
For all of the reasons set forth here, this court should reverse the conclusion by the
trial court that ldaho Code Section 9-503 was the controlling statute for purposes of this
action.
4. The District Erred in its Dismissing the Claims of Callies

and CPM to Recover by Virtue of Part Performance
In its memorandum decision, the district court disallowed any claims based upon the
doctine of partial performance on the theory that the parties to this action never reached
a "complete agreement" on the terms of their listing contract. R, Vol. ll, pp. 313-314. This
court recently explained the doctrine of partial performance in Chapin v. Linden, 144 ldaho

The doctrine of part performance provides that when the parties to an agreement
fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of
frauds, the agreement "may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the
purchaser has partly performed the agreement." Bear Island Wafer Ass'n, Inc. v.
Brown, 125 ldaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994).

The doctrine of part performanceworks in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. "Under ldaho law, part performance per se does not remove a contract
from the operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, the doctrine of part performance
is best understood as a soecific form of the more aeneral orinciole of eauitable
estoppel." Leffunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at7 109. (citing sword v. 'Sweet,
140 ldaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492,499 (2004)). Equitable estoppel generally, and
the doctrine of part performance specifically, assume the existence of a complete
agreement. See Letfunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109. Like any contract
for the sale of land, an oral agreement "must be complete, definite, and certain in
all its terms, or contain provisionswhich are capable in themselves of being reduced
to certainty," before it will be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of
part performance. Leffunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109 (citing Bearlsland
WaferAss'n, Inc., 125 ldaho at 723, 874 P.2d at 534).
The threshold auestion for this Court, then, is whether there was a meetina of the
minds between the Chaoins and the Lindens on the essential terms of their
aareement.
Chapin, 144 ldaho at 396, 162 P.3d at 775 (emphasis added).
As explained in Sections 1 and 2 of this brief, the district court's analysis of the issue
of whether there was a meeting of the minds never went beyond its discussion of the
documents signed by the parties at the outset of the projects in question. And, even in that
context, the court never considered the issue of whether the par01agreement of the parties
was complete, confusing that issue with that of whether the written statement of the
agreement was complete enough to satisfy the statute of frauds. This is evident form the
fact that the district court's analysis of the merits of the motion for partial summary
judgment that preceded its conclusions on the issue of partial performance focused only
upon the efficiency of the property descriptions in the written documents and not on the
different question of whether the parties had actually reached an oral understanding. See

R, Vol. 11, pp. 307-312. Hence, the district court had no basis for concluding, as quoted
above, that the parties had not reached a complete oral agreement.
Had the district court studied the issue, it would have found that the record did not

permit the entry of summary judgment. The motions for partial summary judgment were
grounded on O'Neal's affidavit to the effect that the written contracts did not include any
descriptions of the concerned property. R, Exh. 2. Callies and CPM responded to that
affidavit with evidence asserting that there were complete understandings between the
parties and that those understandings had been reduced to writings that had been made
a part of the contract. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2 and Exh. 9, paragraph 2. And, as explained
above, Callies corroborated that assertion with testimony concerning the other projects
completed by the parties using the same contract forms and following the same procedure.

R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2 and Exh. 9, paragraph 2. O'Neal never rebutted either Callies'
assertion that the understandingwas complete or the historical evidence that she offered
in support of that position. Hence, there is no factual basis in the record for the district
court's conclusion that the parties' parol understanding was incomplete. The summary
judgment granted by the court on that issue of partial performance should be reversed for
that reason.
A further basis for overturning the district court's judgment lies in its failure to

analyze the extent to which Callies and CPM had performed their end of the agreements.
In this connection, the record established, without contradiction: (1) reservation
agreements for all property subject to the brokerage agreements had been secured by Ms.
Callies, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 3 and Exh. 9, paragraph 3; (2) earnest money checks for all
of the property were made out and delivered to Charter Builders, Inc., and received by
O'Neal himself, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 4 and Exh. 9, paragraph 4; (3) that many of the
transactions brokered by Callies actually closed, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 9; (4) Callies and
CPM invested substantial time into the projects and incurred $97,219.26 of expenses in

the course of performing their work, R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 10 and 12 and Exh. 9,
paragraphs 14 and 15; (5) the failure of the transactions that did not close was due only
to the failure of CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks to complete the improvements on
time. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 13. For purposes of this appeal, there is no question but that
the record establishes the performance by CPM and Callies of their obligations under the
listing agreements.
For all of the reasons set forth in this section of the memorandum, the district court's
summary judgment on the issue of partial performance should be reversed.
5. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Claims of Callies
and CPM to Recover on the Theory of Quasi Estoppel

In its memorandum decision, the district court rejected the claims of CPM and
Callies on the theory of quasi estoppel with the following comments:
Here, while Defendants obtained earnest moniesfrom potential buyers forthe Silver
Oaks and Charter Pointe projects, presumably through Callies' efforts, their
subsequent repudiation of the listing agreements is permitted due to the invalidity
of the property descriptions contained therein. . . . Further the Defendants' conduct
is not unconscionable as a matter of law and the Plaintiffs have failed to provide any
evidence that the agreements were consummated due to any wrongful act of the
Defendants. . . .
R. Vol. 11. 315.
This court explained the elements of quasi estoppel in a case very similar to that at
bar, Garner V. Bartschi, supra, in the following words:
Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable advantage,
or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing
positions. ~und&s v. Estate of Snyder, 131 ldaho 689, 695, 963 ~ . 2 h
372,378
(1998). Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require
misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Id.
The elements of quasi-estoppel have been defined as follows:

[I]t precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he
accepted a benefit. The act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought
must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some
disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel must have
been induced to change his position. Eastern ldaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n
v. Neibaur, 133 ldaho 402,410, 987 P.2d 314, 322 (1999).
Garner v. Bartschi, supra. In this case, Callies' affidavit establishes, for purposes of this
appeal, that CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks allowed Callies and CPM to invest
substantial amounts of time and effort into the marketing and sale of the properties at
issue. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 2-5 and 8-12 and Exh. 9, paragraphs 2-4 and 10-15. At one
point, O'Neal implicitly represented to Callies that the sellers could honor the listing
agreements. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 5 and Exh. 9, paragraph 6. The seller, Charter Pointe
and Silver Oaks, accepted the earnest moneys collected by Callies and CPM, amounting
to more than $1,000,000.00, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 8 ($391,875.00) and Exh. 9, paragraph
10 ($656,000.00). Callies worked hard enough on the projects at issue that she was
required to pass on other opportunities to work and incurred $97,219.26 in the course of
her marketing efforts. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 10 and 12 and Exh. 9, paragraphs 14 and 15.
None of this evidence is contradicted in the record. Thus, it would appear that, measured
by the standard enunciated in Garner v. Barischi, supra, CPM and Callies have established
a prima facie case of quasi estoppel.
The district court's holding to the contrary is virtually inexplicable. Estoppel is an
equitable remedy. Allen v. Dunston, 131 ldaho 464,958 P.2d 1150 (1998). Claims arising
in equity will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available. Iron Eagle
Development, LLC v. Qualify Design Systems, Inc., 138 ldaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 (2003).

Thus, for the district court to point out the legal impediment to recovery of damages for
breach of contract should have established the basis for seeking equitable relief. See
Holscherv. James, 124 ldaho 443,860 P.2d 646 (1993). The district court, however, cited
the legal impediment as a basis for denying equitable relief, which would appear to turn the
rules cited above on their head.
One who tacitly encourages work to be done and who accepts the benefits of that
work cannot afterwards exercise rights contrary to the prior consent and acceptance of
benefits, if the consent and benefits have induced the opposite party to change his position
to his prejudice. Seeling v. Security National Bank of Fairfield, 40 ldaho 574, 235 P. 976
(1925). In this case, CBI, Charter Point and Silver Oaks allowed CPM and Callies to
secure numerous contracts at a substantial cost of time and money ($97,219.26) and
accepted more than $1,000,000.00 of benefits resulting from that work. The trial court
held, as a matter of law, that this was not taking an unconscionable advantage. Intuitively,
this conclusion appears to be unsupportable. The law school example of requiring the
homeowner to pay the child who mows his lawn, even in the absence of a legally binding
contract, pales in comparison to the facts of this case, which appear, even on the face of
O'Neal's affidavit to present a classic case of "lying in the weeds" by allowing CPM and
Callies to perform substantial work for the benefit of CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks,
while refusing to agree to the correction of the contract that would allow the broker to be
paid for that work.
Finally, the district court's reliance upon Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123
ldaho 253, 846 P.2d 904 (1993), R, Vol. 11, p. 15, is predicated upon a misreading of that
case. The only reference in that case to a wrongful act appeared in the court's discussion
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of how a seller's wrongful refusal to close a contract negotiated by the broker could not
defeat the right of the broker to payment of a commission. 123 ldaho at 260. That holding
provides no justification for the requirement imposed by the district court in this case that
CPM and Callies had to prove that the listing agreements were consummated due to a
wrongful act of CBI, Charter Pointe or Silver Oaks. This requirement appears to contradict
the statement in Garner v. Bartschi, supra, that quasi estoppel does not require proof of
a misrepresentation by anyone. Given the fact that the district court's reliance upon
Margaret H. Wayne Trust is questionable, the following conclusion, which itself is contrary
to unimpeachable precedent, cannot withstand appellate review.
For all of the reasons set forth in this section of the brief, the summary judgment
granted by the district court dismissing the claims of CPM and Callies on the theory of
quasi estoppel should be reversed.
6. Callies and CPM are Entitled to the Attorney Fees
Incurred in Prosecuting This Appeal.

Callies and CPM are entitled to the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal,
because paragraph 23 of the listing agreements includes an attorney fee clause:
In the event either party shall initiate and suit or action or appeal on any
matter related to this Agreement the defaulting party shall pay the prevailing party
all damages and expenses resulting from the default, including all reasonable
attorneys' fees and all court costs and other expenses incurred by the prevailing
party.
In addition, the listing agreements are both contracts for services and commercial
transactions, which means that Callies and CPM are also entitled to attorney fees under
ldaho Code Section 12-120(3). See Tentingerv. McPheters, 132 ldaho 620,977 P.2d 234

In making this request, Callies and CPM acknowledge that a reversal of the
summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings does not guarantee that they will
ultimately be the parties who prevail in this action. At a minimum, however, they are
entitled to a ruling to the effect that, if they ultimately prevail in this action, they are entitled
to the attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this appeal.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, CPM and Callies request this Court to reverse the
summary judgment granted by the district court in all respects and to remand all of the claims
at issue in this appeal, including those for breach of contract, partial performance and quasi
estoppel, for a trial on the merits. Callies and CPM also request the court to hold that any
issues concerning the legal enforceability of the property descriptions in the listing agreements
should ultimately be resolved under ldaho Code Section 9-508 ratherthan ldaho Code Section
9-503. Finally, Callies and CPM request the court to hold that they are entitled to the attorney
fees incurred in the prosecution of this appeal, if not immediately, then at least in the event that
they ultimately prevail on the claims at issue in this appeal.
DATED this 1l t h day of September, 2008.
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